Birthright Citizenship and Plyler: A Legislative Solution
By James Scott Trimm
Original Intent vs. Plain Text: The Birthright Citizenship Dilemma
There is a tension at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that has shaped more than a century of constitutional law.
On one hand, the historical intent of the amendment is clear. It was adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War to secure the civil and legal rights of newly freed slaves—ensuring that states could not deny them the basic protections of citizenship.
On the other hand, the actual wording of the amendment is far broader than that specific purpose.
The Citizenship Clause reads:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens…”
That language does not mention freed slaves.
It does not limit itself to any particular class.
Instead, it speaks in universal terms: “all persons.”
This creates a fundamental question:
Should the Constitution be interpreted according to the specific problem it was written to solve—or according to the full scope of the words that were actually written?
The Supreme Court confronted that question directly in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.
In that case, the Court was asked whether a child born in the United States to non-citizen parents was a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court answered yes, and in doing so, it anchored its reasoning not in a narrow reading of historical intent, but in the plain meaning of the text.
The Court emphasized that the phrase:
“subject to the jurisdiction thereof”
must be understood in a broad, largely geographic sense. If a person is born within the territory of the United States and is subject to its laws, then that person is within its jurisdiction.
The Court made this point unmistakably clear when it stated that:
it is “impossible to construe” the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as narrower than the phrase “within its jurisdiction” elsewhere in the same amendment.
With that single interpretive move, the Court effectively resolved the tension in favor of text over intent.
Birthright citizenship was no longer tied to the specific historical purpose of protecting freed slaves. Instead, it was grounded in a general principle:
Birth within the territory, combined with jurisdiction, confers citizenship—except in a few narrow, historically recognized exceptions.
Those exceptions included:
- Children of foreign diplomats
- Children born to enemy forces occupying U.S. territory
Outside of those limited cases, the rule became clear and enduring:
If you are born here, and you are subject to U.S. law, you are a citizen.
This interpretation has shaped constitutional law ever since—and it is the foundation upon which later decisions, including debates over the rights of non-citizens, have been built.
But it all begins here:
With a tension between what the amendment was meant to do, and what its words actually allow it to do.
The Plyler Decision
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court made a 5-4 landmark ruling that required Texas taxpayers to provide public education to persons who are in the country illegally. This case was Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The purpose of this paper is to provide a fresh approach for overturning this ruling.
The Plyler decision was rooted in an interpretation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
This section may be broken down into the Citizenship Clause:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
And the Equal Protection Clause:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
In Wong Kim Ark, the Court said:
The words “in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress which proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well-known case of The Exchange and as the equivalent of the words "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States,” and the converse of the words “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States” as habitually used in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word “jurisdiction” in the last clause of the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is impossible to construe the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the opening sentence as less comprehensive than the words “within its jurisdiction” in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons “within the jurisdiction” of one of the States of the Union are not “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
(United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) at 687)
In the Plyler decision, the Court followed this connection and interpreted the phrase “any person within its jurisdiction” in the Equal Protection Clause through the parallel phrase in the Citizenship Clause, which reads “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”
Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction, while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants’ view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not “within the jurisdiction” of a State even if they are present within a State’s boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment support that constricting construction of the phrase “within its jurisdiction.” [Footnote 10] We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process.
(Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) at 211)
Footnote 10 to this statement reads:
Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term “jurisdiction” was used. He further noted that it was:
“impossible to construe the words ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words ‘within its jurisdiction,’ in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons ‘within the jurisdiction’ of one of the States of the Union are not ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’”
This parallel allowed the Court to apply its ruling in Wong Kim Ark to the Plyler case. In Wong Kim Ark, the Court had said:
The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes.
(Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693)
On this basis, the Court determined that since Wong Kim Ark did not fit into one of these common law exceptions, he was “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” and his birthright citizenship was guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, illegal immigrants are also “within its jurisdiction” as described by the Fourteenth Amendment if they don’t fit any of these same common law exceptions. As such, they would be entitled to “equal protection” under the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore access to public school education.
The Legislative Solution
However, if persons who have crossed the border illegally could be shown to fall within one of these common law exceptions under Wong Kim Ark, they would not be “within its jurisdiction” and would not be entitled to “equal protection.” This would relieve Texas taxpayers of an obligation to fund education for persons who have crossed the southern border illegally.
One of the common law exceptions was articulated by the Court in Wong Kim Ark as “enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory.”
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution states in its final paragraph:
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
In U.S. v. Abbott (2023), Texas argued:
Nonetheless, the political question doctrine bars consideration of Texas’s “invasion” defense. Texas argues that it constructed the floating barrier pursuant to the Self-Defense Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, because it is being “invaded” by “[t]housands of aliens ․ including members of cartels,” and thus asks the Court to exempt Texas’s conduct from the RHA. To credit Texas’s allegation of invasion would be to make a policy decision on a topic the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have identified as a nonjusticiable political question.
In this case, Abbott ultimately prevailed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632), but the court did not rule on the “invasion” argument. Thus, the fact stands that the State of Texas has invoked Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution declaring an “actual invasion” along its southern border.
This declaration of an “actual invasion” in accordance with the U.S. Constitution classifies those who have crossed Texas’ border with Mexico illegally as within the common law exception articulated by the Court in Wong Kim Ark as “enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory.” As such, they are not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as understood in Wong Kim Ark and thus not “within its jurisdiction” and entitled to equal protection as understood in Plyler.
This is why it is time for legislative action. Congress and the State of Texas should enact a bill that formally recognizes large-scale illegal entry across the southern border as constituting an “actual invasion” within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Such legislation should further clarify that individuals entering under these conditions—particularly when facilitated by organized criminal networks—fall within the category already acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark as “enemies within” during a “hostile occupation” of territory. By grounding this classification in existing constitutional language and judicial precedent, such a bill would not attempt to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather to apply its own framework consistently—defining the outer limits of “jurisdiction” in a way that reflects both the realities on the ground and the logic the Court has already established.
Conclusion
The issue before us is not whether the Fourteenth Amendment is valid, nor whether its protections are important. It remains one of the most vital achievements in American constitutional history.
The issue is how it has been interpreted.
Through United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court resolved the tension between intent and text in favor of a broad, geographic understanding of “jurisdiction.” Through Plyler v. Doe, that same reasoning was extended further—applying equal protection even to those unlawfully present in the country.
But in doing so, the Court also made something else clear:
Jurisdiction is not unlimited.
It has exceptions—explicitly recognized within the Court’s own reasoning.
That is where the path forward lies.
If the definition of “jurisdiction” has been expanded to include those unlawfully present, then it can also be examined, clarified, and properly limited according to the same legal framework the Court itself has already established.
Texas has already raised the constitutional question. The courts have declined to resolve it. The executive branch has attempted to act—but cannot redefine the Constitution on its own.
Which leaves us with a simple but unavoidable reality:
The meaning of “jurisdiction” under the Fourteenth Amendment remains unresolved at its outer boundaries.
This is why it is time for legislative action.
Congress and the State of Texas should enact a bill that formally recognizes large-scale illegal entry across the southern border as constituting an “actual invasion” within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Such legislation should further clarify that individuals entering under these conditions—particularly when facilitated by organized criminal networks—fall within the category already acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark as “enemies within” during a “hostile occupation” of territory.
By grounding this classification in existing constitutional language and judicial precedent, such a bill would not attempt to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather to apply its own framework consistently—defining the outer limits of “jurisdiction” in a way that reflects both the realities on the ground and the logic the Court has already established.
This is not a call to ignore precedent.
It is a call to apply it consistently.
Because the same logic that expanded the meaning of “jurisdiction” can—and should—be used to define its limits.






