Was Munford Gun Grabbing Justified by Federal Law?
By
James Scott Trimm
News on this story is breaking, In recent blogs I have written about.Associate Judge James Munford's Gun Grabbing court order. Munford is the Associate Judge of the 322nd Family Court. Each Family in Tarrant County has an elected District Court Judge, and an appointed Associate Judge. This blogger has obtained a court order which Associate Judge Munford signed in 2009 “grabbing” Tarrant County gun owner and father Michael Keith Ives guns:
“…the Father is not to have in his possession or control a
firearm and he is placed on notice that he is not to have in his possession any
firearm until such time as the injunction is resolved. The firearms may be delivered to a third
party for storage such as the paternal grandparent.”
As I had reported in the past, Munford's Gun Grabbing provision was later removed by 322nd District Court Judge Nancy Berger, but only after the NRA got involved and began backing Mr. Ives' in his fight to keep his guns.
After my initial blog, Judge Harris (233rd Family Court ) rushed to support his old college buddy saying:
A blogger has recently posted some
disturbing misinformation about Judge Jim Munford and his alleged "gun
grabbing" in the court orders he routinely issues. The truth is that all
orders containing standard injunctive language "as to persons"
prohibit and person subject to that order from the possession of a firearm or
amunition. Not the rule of the judge,
the subject of the Federal law (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)). If Judge Munford's rulings are to be
attacked in such a specious detail, the blogger should fairly characterize
every judge and associate judge that issue injunctions as to persons as
"gun grabbers." More
specifically, every single judge or associate judge sitting in family or
probate courts in the State of Texas.
I don't like that level of Federal
involvement in State issues. I have
known Judge Munford since our college days at UTA and I know him to be a
strident supporter of the 2nd Amendment.
The blogger's characterization of Judge Munford as a "gun
grabber" is made with either a sad ignorance of the law or a malicious
misrepresentation of the truth. Or as
some call it "fake news."
My blog in response to Harris can be seen by clicking here: Judge Harris Defends Munford Gun Grabbing.
Judge Bennett (360th Family Court) also stepped up to support Munford's Gun Grabbing order. She shared Harris' statement saying "I agree with Judge Harris."
And more support for Munford's Gun Grabbing came from Family Court Attorney Jeff Kaitcer, who is rumored to be Munford's preferred choice for Associate Judge of the 322nd should Munford win the election. Kaitcer said:
I think that the jamestrimm blog is nothing more than 'fake news' ... Judge Harris is exactly right. The blogger wants a Tarrant County District Judge to declare a Federal Statute unconstitutional. To do so would be the very definition of an “Activist Judge” and legislating from the Bench which I thought, as Republicans, we opposed.
My exchange with Kaitcer can be seen in my blog Gun Grabbing Rinos in Texas.
In supporting Munford’s Gun Grabbing Order these two judges and potential judge have
erroneously claimed that Munford's order was required by a Federal Law (USC 18 922 G)
and further erroneously claimed that Munford’s order was supported by U.S. v. Emerson in
the 5th Circuit Court.
In the wake of the controversy, Tarrant Families Matter engaged a Washington DC Law Firm of Federal Litigation Experts to weigh in with an authoritative analysis.
A Constitutional Lawyer's Perspective of the Munford Case From a Texan’s Eyes
• It is basic law that state judges have the authority, indeed the duty, to follow the constitution, even if that means ruling that federal statutes are unconstitutional. There are many examples of state courts doing this successfully or unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App. 1986); Pierce Cty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003). Here, there are potential constitutional arguments that section 922(g)(8) is invalid under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but they are beside the point.
• The larger issue is that Judge Munford didn't just fail to fight for the Second Amendment; he and other judges like him are actively working to undermine it, and the basic principles of the Texas Republican Party. The fundamental truth is that even if 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8) is constitutional, Munford should not have included in his order an injunction specifically barring Mr. Ives from possessing a gun and judges should not routinely enter orders barring divorcing parties from threatening each other unless there is an actual need to do so.
o First, section 922(g)(8) simply did not apply at the time Munford entered his order in August 2009, because there was no injunction in place at that time meeting the requirement in section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). It appears that such an order had previously applied, having been entered in June 2009, but that order appears to have expired by operation of law 14 days later. Meanwhile, a generic "injunction as to persons" order was in effect when Judge Munford entered his order in August 2009, but that "injunction as to persons" did not contain the explicit language required to trigger section 922(g)(8). Thus, section 922 was not even relevant at the time Judge Munford entered his order.
oSecond, and perhaps more importantly, even if a qualifying order under section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was in place at the time of Munford's order, there is absolutely nothing in section 922 that would require Judge Munford to go further and add an injunction barring Ives from possessing a gun. In fact, in the Emerson case, the Family judge had not included such an order. Judge Munford's order was purely voluntarily and seriously undermines principles we hold dear.
Judge Munford effectively eliminated Ives' ability to even challenge that section 922(g)(8) is invalid under the Second Amendment. Even if Ives could successfully argue that the Second Amendment made section 922(g)(8) invalid, Ives still could not possess a gun because, in addition to the so-call injunction "as to persons" Judge Munford voluntarily added a separate injunction specifically barring Ives from possessing a gun.
Judge Munford took the matter from being governed solely by section 922(g)(8) – a federal law that the State of Texas could have chosen not to enforce – into one of state law that Texas courts would be required to enforce. That is, Texas does not have to enforce alleged section 922(g)(8) violations. But it does have to enforce violations of injunctions entered by Texas judges.
o Third, no judge is under any obligation to enter automatically an injunction that would trigger the potential application of section 922(g)(8). Yet, some Family judges insist on mindlessly entering these orders as a matter of course. For example, at various times, there was an injunction barring Ives – and his wife – from all manner of things listed in Texas Family Code section 6.502(a). But just because a Family judge "may render" such order does not mean that he or she has to or should do so in every single divorce. In the Emerson case, the Fifth Circuit explained that Congress presumed in section 922(g)(8) that state court judges would not enter qualifying injunctions unless "evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined." 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001). No such finding was ever made against Ives and his wife in their case. Yet, broad injunctions barring all sorts of conduct – including threatening each other – were included. There was no basis for the Family judges to do that. That mistake is made even more egregious by the fact that these unfounded injunctions might have the impact of triggering section 922(g)(8) and thus unjustifiably taking away a person's guns merely because he or she is getting divorced.
Any bloggers or gun groups believing in the 2nd Amendment, all political parties, scholarly legal journals, and any other interested parties may use this opinion because Tarrant Families Matter obtained it for the purpose of educating judges, politicians, and other legal scholars with regard to the pitfalls involved in issues concerning possession of guns by families. Sure, there is a political race developing in Tarrant County in which this issue and other legal issues will get much attention, but our purpose is to inform you. Please come back and check us out as we analyze other issues significant to families.
© Copyrighted Tarrant Families Matter
Judge Harris Responded by attacking the credibility of the analysis, simply because the expert analysis came from a Washington DC firm (is Harris implying that a DC firm is likely to be biased in favor of gun rights vs. a supposedly Republican Texas Judge?)
In the wake of the controversy, Tarrant Families Matter engaged a Washington DC Law Firm of Federal Litigation Experts to weigh in with an authoritative analysis.
BREAKING NEWS: This opinion speaks for itself
A Constitutional Lawyer's Perspective of the Munford Case From a Texan’s Eyes
• It is basic law that state judges have the authority, indeed the duty, to follow the constitution, even if that means ruling that federal statutes are unconstitutional. There are many examples of state courts doing this successfully or unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App. 1986); Pierce Cty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003). Here, there are potential constitutional arguments that section 922(g)(8) is invalid under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but they are beside the point.
• The larger issue is that Judge Munford didn't just fail to fight for the Second Amendment; he and other judges like him are actively working to undermine it, and the basic principles of the Texas Republican Party. The fundamental truth is that even if 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8) is constitutional, Munford should not have included in his order an injunction specifically barring Mr. Ives from possessing a gun and judges should not routinely enter orders barring divorcing parties from threatening each other unless there is an actual need to do so.
o First, section 922(g)(8) simply did not apply at the time Munford entered his order in August 2009, because there was no injunction in place at that time meeting the requirement in section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). It appears that such an order had previously applied, having been entered in June 2009, but that order appears to have expired by operation of law 14 days later. Meanwhile, a generic "injunction as to persons" order was in effect when Judge Munford entered his order in August 2009, but that "injunction as to persons" did not contain the explicit language required to trigger section 922(g)(8). Thus, section 922 was not even relevant at the time Judge Munford entered his order.
oSecond, and perhaps more importantly, even if a qualifying order under section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) was in place at the time of Munford's order, there is absolutely nothing in section 922 that would require Judge Munford to go further and add an injunction barring Ives from possessing a gun. In fact, in the Emerson case, the Family judge had not included such an order. Judge Munford's order was purely voluntarily and seriously undermines principles we hold dear.
Judge Munford effectively eliminated Ives' ability to even challenge that section 922(g)(8) is invalid under the Second Amendment. Even if Ives could successfully argue that the Second Amendment made section 922(g)(8) invalid, Ives still could not possess a gun because, in addition to the so-call injunction "as to persons" Judge Munford voluntarily added a separate injunction specifically barring Ives from possessing a gun.
Judge Munford took the matter from being governed solely by section 922(g)(8) – a federal law that the State of Texas could have chosen not to enforce – into one of state law that Texas courts would be required to enforce. That is, Texas does not have to enforce alleged section 922(g)(8) violations. But it does have to enforce violations of injunctions entered by Texas judges.
o Third, no judge is under any obligation to enter automatically an injunction that would trigger the potential application of section 922(g)(8). Yet, some Family judges insist on mindlessly entering these orders as a matter of course. For example, at various times, there was an injunction barring Ives – and his wife – from all manner of things listed in Texas Family Code section 6.502(a). But just because a Family judge "may render" such order does not mean that he or she has to or should do so in every single divorce. In the Emerson case, the Fifth Circuit explained that Congress presumed in section 922(g)(8) that state court judges would not enter qualifying injunctions unless "evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined." 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001). No such finding was ever made against Ives and his wife in their case. Yet, broad injunctions barring all sorts of conduct – including threatening each other – were included. There was no basis for the Family judges to do that. That mistake is made even more egregious by the fact that these unfounded injunctions might have the impact of triggering section 922(g)(8) and thus unjustifiably taking away a person's guns merely because he or she is getting divorced.
Any bloggers or gun groups believing in the 2nd Amendment, all political parties, scholarly legal journals, and any other interested parties may use this opinion because Tarrant Families Matter obtained it for the purpose of educating judges, politicians, and other legal scholars with regard to the pitfalls involved in issues concerning possession of guns by families. Sure, there is a political race developing in Tarrant County in which this issue and other legal issues will get much attention, but our purpose is to inform you. Please come back and check us out as we analyze other issues significant to families.
© Copyrighted Tarrant Families Matter
Judge Harris Responded by attacking the credibility of the analysis, simply because the expert analysis came from a Washington DC firm (is Harris implying that a DC firm is likely to be biased in favor of gun rights vs. a supposedly Republican Texas Judge?)
Here Harris keeps right on citing USC 18 922 (g) and Emerson like a mindless parrot. He keeps pushing the false narrative that Federal Law made Munford do it. But the truth is that USC 18 922 (g) only applies when certain language appears "explicitly" in the injunction. The Associate Judges Report referred to by Harris contained no such explicit language and consisted of nothing more than a box checked next to the words "Mutual Temporary Injunction as to Persons." which does not meet the criteria of the type of order described in USC 18 922 (g).
Judge Patricia Baca Bennett of the 360th Family Court has dug in her heels in support of Munford's gun grabbing order. She has attacked the material written by the DC law firm as unreliable simply because they are "Yankees" (in this case Yankees that care more about gun rights than these Texas judges do).
In 2001, the United States Appeals Court for the 5th Circuit upheld a case out of the Lubbock Division in the Northern District of Texas. This was was the United States vs. Emerson. http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1332436.html
In this case, a Family Court issued what appeared to be an innocuous temporary injunction. This injunction is common in Family Courts throughout Texas and is specifically authorized to be issued by the Texas Family Code without the necessity of bond. The man in this case purchased a pistol and was arrested by the FBI and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He was convicted and sentenced to prison.
In order to avoid this happening to a litigant in his court, Judge James Munford placed a warning on his fill in the blank Associate Judge's report that if the parties check a box for temporary injunctions as to persons, then those subject to those injunctions can not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
Like Judge Harris, Judge Bennett keeps repeating USC 18 922 (g) and Emerson like a parrot. Yet USC 18 922 does not even apply to the Munford order. For an injunction to invoke USC 18 922 (g) it must be an injunction that "explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury." a box checked next to the words "Mutual Temporary Injunction as to Persons" does not come near meeting that standard which must be met "explicitly" in the injunction.
Moreover there is nothing in USC 18 922 (g) that requires a judge to write a gun grabbing provision into an order (especially an order to which USC 18 922 (g) did not apply anyway).
Furthermore Emerson does not apply to the Munford order for several reasons, not the least of which is that Emerson is a ruling about the constitutionality of a certain application of USC 18 922 (g) and USC 18 922 (g) is not even invoked by the Munford order.
Moreover Munford's Gun Grabbing order was not a "warning" it was a court order. not only was USC 18 922 (g) not invoked by any injunction in effect at the time Munford wrote the order (or even by the order itself) but Munford's order (unlike USC 18 922 (g) would have had other negative consequences. To begin with State authorities are not required to enforce Federal laws (Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),). , but are required to enforce State Court orders. Secondly USC 18 922 (g) would have only applied to fireams which had become subjects of interstate commerce. However Munford's order, unlike USC 18 922 (g) applied even to firearms manufactured and sold within Texas, and its enforcement was obligatory to Texas authorities. So while USC 18 922 (g) did not at all apply, Munford's order was more far reaching in its scope and effect than USC 18 922 (g) would have been had it even applied in this case.
Judge Bennet erroneously stated:
Judge James Munford placed a warning on his fill in the blank Associate Judge's report that if the parties check a box for temporary injunctions as to persons, then those subject to those injunctions can not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
This is a falsehood. There is no such warning on the Associate Judges Report. I have posted a facsimile of the two page "fill in the blank Associate Judges Report" (which is dated July 9th, 2009) below to prove that this is an utter falsehood:
In fact the "Gun Grabbing" provision was not a warning, but an actual provision on Page 5 of the orders issued and signed by Munford more than a Month later on August 14th 2009:
Judge Bennett said:
In this case, a Family Court issued what appeared to be an innocuous temporary injunction. This injunction is common in Family Courts throughout Texas and is specifically authorized to be issued by the Texas Family Code without the necessity of bond. The man in this case purchased a pistol and was arrested by the FBI and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He was convicted and sentenced to prison.
Ive's case was very different from the Emerson case. To begin with in Emerson the explicit language needed to invoke USC 18 922 (g) was present, whereas in Ive's it was not. Moreover, in Emerson the court determined that Emerson’s due process rights were not violated because in USC 18 922 G (8)(C)(ii) Congress “proceeded on the assumption that the laws of the several states were such that court orders, issued after notices of hearing, should not embrace the prohibitions of paragraph (C)(ii) unless such either were not contested or evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined.” And that “it is clear to us that the Texas law meets these general minimal standards.” By contrast in Ives, no such evidence was credited by the court, meaning that under the Emerson opinion, Munford’s Gun Grabbing provision violated not only Texas law, but Ive’s Second Amendment and Due Process rights as well. Munfords order was not only a violation of Texas law, but unconstitutional as well.
Judge Bennett seems to believe that "an innocuous temporary injunction" can invoke USC 18 922 (
yet the DC legal analyst was quite correct in saying:
no judge is under any obligation to enter automatically an injunction that would trigger the potential application of section 922(g)(8). Yet, some Family judges insist on mindlessly entering these orders as a matter of course. For example, at various times, there was an injunction barring Ives – and his wife – from all manner of things listed in Texas Family Code section 6.502(a). But just because a Family judge "may render" such order does not mean that he or she has to or should do so in every single divorce. In the Emerson case, the Fifth Circuit explained that Congress presumed in section 922(g)(8) that state court judges would not enter qualifying injunctions unless "evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined." 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001). No such finding was ever made against Ives and his wife in their case. Yet, broad injunctions barring all sorts of conduct – including threatening each other – were included. There was no basis for the Family judges to do that. That mistake is made even more egregious by the fact that these unfounded injunctions might have the impact of triggering section 922(g)(8) and thus unjustifiably taking away a person's guns merely because he or she is getting divorced.
Judge Bennett Continues:
This is now being called a "gun grab" by a blogger and a Facebook page. The Facebook page has reached deep into the swamp to hire Yankee Washington D.C. attorneys to determine if our Tarrant County conservative, Republican, Family Law Judges are correct in their legal assessment. This particular Constitutional Conservative doesn't really care what the Yankee lawyers have to say on this matter.
Bennett has fallen into the logic error of Argumentum ad Hominem, attacking a proposition, not based on facts or logic, but by an attack on the reputation of the one making the proposition. Apparently Judge Bennett thinks that she must be right, because the counter argument is offered by "Yankee lawyers". It is ironic that these "Yankee lawyers" care more about protecting Second Amendment rights than these Texas judges!
A bit further Judge Bennett says "Today that blogger, who has previously called Judge Munford a "RINO," has endorsed Jennifer Wiggins Moore for the 322nd."
I have? I think I would have remembered endorsing Jennifer Moore on December 7th, or any other day.(I did make a statement encourage people to join me in supporting Moore back in mid November)
Judge Bennett then says: "The blogger also indicated that Jennifer Wiggins Moore has represented the interest of the NRA."
This is another falsehood. I have never made any claim that Moore "represented the interest of the NRA." I said only that "...the attorney who represented Mr, Ives, and who worked with the NRA to protect Mr. Ives from Munford's Gun Grabbing provision, was none other than Jennifer Wiggins Moore!" (you can see that whole blog here: Jennifer Moore and NRA Stopped Munford Gun Grab
Just about the only thing Judge Bennett has gotten right was her opening sentence, "There is a great deal of misinformation on the internet." Unfortunately it is coming from her!
Judge Patricia Baca Bennett of the 360th Family Court has dug in her heels in support of Munford's gun grabbing order. She has attacked the material written by the DC law firm as unreliable simply because they are "Yankees" (in this case Yankees that care more about gun rights than these Texas judges do).
In 2001, the United States Appeals Court for the 5th Circuit upheld a case out of the Lubbock Division in the Northern District of Texas. This was was the United States vs. Emerson. http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1332436.html
In this case, a Family Court issued what appeared to be an innocuous temporary injunction. This injunction is common in Family Courts throughout Texas and is specifically authorized to be issued by the Texas Family Code without the necessity of bond. The man in this case purchased a pistol and was arrested by the FBI and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He was convicted and sentenced to prison.
In order to avoid this happening to a litigant in his court, Judge James Munford placed a warning on his fill in the blank Associate Judge's report that if the parties check a box for temporary injunctions as to persons, then those subject to those injunctions can not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
Like Judge Harris, Judge Bennett keeps repeating USC 18 922 (g) and Emerson like a parrot. Yet USC 18 922 does not even apply to the Munford order. For an injunction to invoke USC 18 922 (g) it must be an injunction that "explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury." a box checked next to the words "Mutual Temporary Injunction as to Persons" does not come near meeting that standard which must be met "explicitly" in the injunction.
Moreover there is nothing in USC 18 922 (g) that requires a judge to write a gun grabbing provision into an order (especially an order to which USC 18 922 (g) did not apply anyway).
Furthermore Emerson does not apply to the Munford order for several reasons, not the least of which is that Emerson is a ruling about the constitutionality of a certain application of USC 18 922 (g) and USC 18 922 (g) is not even invoked by the Munford order.
Moreover Munford's Gun Grabbing order was not a "warning" it was a court order. not only was USC 18 922 (g) not invoked by any injunction in effect at the time Munford wrote the order (or even by the order itself) but Munford's order (unlike USC 18 922 (g) would have had other negative consequences. To begin with State authorities are not required to enforce Federal laws (Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),). , but are required to enforce State Court orders. Secondly USC 18 922 (g) would have only applied to fireams which had become subjects of interstate commerce. However Munford's order, unlike USC 18 922 (g) applied even to firearms manufactured and sold within Texas, and its enforcement was obligatory to Texas authorities. So while USC 18 922 (g) did not at all apply, Munford's order was more far reaching in its scope and effect than USC 18 922 (g) would have been had it even applied in this case.
Judge Bennet erroneously stated:
Judge James Munford placed a warning on his fill in the blank Associate Judge's report that if the parties check a box for temporary injunctions as to persons, then those subject to those injunctions can not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
This is a falsehood. There is no such warning on the Associate Judges Report. I have posted a facsimile of the two page "fill in the blank Associate Judges Report" (which is dated July 9th, 2009) below to prove that this is an utter falsehood:
In fact the "Gun Grabbing" provision was not a warning, but an actual provision on Page 5 of the orders issued and signed by Munford more than a Month later on August 14th 2009:
Judge Bennett said:
In this case, a Family Court issued what appeared to be an innocuous temporary injunction. This injunction is common in Family Courts throughout Texas and is specifically authorized to be issued by the Texas Family Code without the necessity of bond. The man in this case purchased a pistol and was arrested by the FBI and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He was convicted and sentenced to prison.
Ive's case was very different from the Emerson case. To begin with in Emerson the explicit language needed to invoke USC 18 922 (g) was present, whereas in Ive's it was not. Moreover, in Emerson the court determined that Emerson’s due process rights were not violated because in USC 18 922 G (8)(C)(ii) Congress “proceeded on the assumption that the laws of the several states were such that court orders, issued after notices of hearing, should not embrace the prohibitions of paragraph (C)(ii) unless such either were not contested or evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined.” And that “it is clear to us that the Texas law meets these general minimal standards.” By contrast in Ives, no such evidence was credited by the court, meaning that under the Emerson opinion, Munford’s Gun Grabbing provision violated not only Texas law, but Ive’s Second Amendment and Due Process rights as well. Munfords order was not only a violation of Texas law, but unconstitutional as well.
Judge Bennett seems to believe that "an innocuous temporary injunction" can invoke USC 18 922 (
yet the DC legal analyst was quite correct in saying:
no judge is under any obligation to enter automatically an injunction that would trigger the potential application of section 922(g)(8). Yet, some Family judges insist on mindlessly entering these orders as a matter of course. For example, at various times, there was an injunction barring Ives – and his wife – from all manner of things listed in Texas Family Code section 6.502(a). But just because a Family judge "may render" such order does not mean that he or she has to or should do so in every single divorce. In the Emerson case, the Fifth Circuit explained that Congress presumed in section 922(g)(8) that state court judges would not enter qualifying injunctions unless "evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined." 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001). No such finding was ever made against Ives and his wife in their case. Yet, broad injunctions barring all sorts of conduct – including threatening each other – were included. There was no basis for the Family judges to do that. That mistake is made even more egregious by the fact that these unfounded injunctions might have the impact of triggering section 922(g)(8) and thus unjustifiably taking away a person's guns merely because he or she is getting divorced.
Judge Bennett Continues:
This is now being called a "gun grab" by a blogger and a Facebook page. The Facebook page has reached deep into the swamp to hire Yankee Washington D.C. attorneys to determine if our Tarrant County conservative, Republican, Family Law Judges are correct in their legal assessment. This particular Constitutional Conservative doesn't really care what the Yankee lawyers have to say on this matter.
Bennett has fallen into the logic error of Argumentum ad Hominem, attacking a proposition, not based on facts or logic, but by an attack on the reputation of the one making the proposition. Apparently Judge Bennett thinks that she must be right, because the counter argument is offered by "Yankee lawyers". It is ironic that these "Yankee lawyers" care more about protecting Second Amendment rights than these Texas judges!
A bit further Judge Bennett says "Today that blogger, who has previously called Judge Munford a "RINO," has endorsed Jennifer Wiggins Moore for the 322nd."
I have? I think I would have remembered endorsing Jennifer Moore on December 7th, or any other day.(I did make a statement encourage people to join me in supporting Moore back in mid November)
Judge Bennett then says: "The blogger also indicated that Jennifer Wiggins Moore has represented the interest of the NRA."
This is another falsehood. I have never made any claim that Moore "represented the interest of the NRA." I said only that "...the attorney who represented Mr, Ives, and who worked with the NRA to protect Mr. Ives from Munford's Gun Grabbing provision, was none other than Jennifer Wiggins Moore!" (you can see that whole blog here: Jennifer Moore and NRA Stopped Munford Gun Grab
Just about the only thing Judge Bennett has gotten right was her opening sentence, "There is a great deal of misinformation on the internet." Unfortunately it is coming from her!
In the end Judge Munford issued an order which would have deprived a man who had not been accused of any wrong doing, of his right to bear arms. Sadly several Family Court judges and a potential future Family Court Judge are scrambling to rationalize this gun grabbing order. It is ironic that the Yankee Washington DC federal litigation lawyers are more protective of gun rights than these Gun Grabbing Texas judges!
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